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A stra t 
The Paris Peace Conference represented a turning point for the British Empire. Great 
Britain and its Dominions placed on the side of the Entente all their military might 
together with the most powerful navy. However, at the end of the war, Britain, in spite of 
being a victorious country, saw its world hegemony reduced and its control over the 
widest Empire in the history of the world irremediably affected. On the other side of the 
Atlantic, the United States turned out to be the real winner of the war and this gave them 
great leverage in Paris in shaping the new international order. However, the passage from 
the period of the Pa  Britanni a, which for almost a century granted stability in Europe, 
to the Pa   meri ana, was not so unexpected and painful for the British political 
establishment as we usually think. Among the British establishment, there was a 
movement that was able to shape the country’s foreign policy for more than twenty years 
and prepared the ground for the creation of the Anglo-American alliance. This article tries 
to focus on the circumstances that made possible this tran atio im erii and the role played 
by the Round Table movement in Paris in this respect.  
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Intro u tion   a in  t e foun ations of a ne   orl  or er 
The Twentieth Century is in many ways the century that saw the United States rising to 
become a global power. In this sense, many historians consider the first half of the century 
as a turning point between the period of Pa  Britanni a and the inevitable beginning of 
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Pa   meri ana ( ouis, 200 ). This definition is only partially correct, since the rise of 
the United States was not so unexpected and uncontrollable as it could appear, but was 
the result of a process of rapprochement between the British and American élite  which 
started at the end of the First World War. Despite the revolutionary and dramatic way in 
which the “American Century” – to use Henry  uce’s well-known phrase – began, it is 
more appropriate to consider the rise of the United States to the  tat   of superpower 
more in terms of continuity than a departure from the previous balance of forces in world 
politics ( uce, 19 1:  1-  ). From this perspective, the US intervention in the First World 
War and the American participation at the Paris Peace Conference set off the handover 
of world hegemony between the two most powerful Anglo-Saxon nations or, as Zimmern 
aptly emphasized, it formalized the rise of the Third British Empire (Zimmern, 192 : 1-
20). 
Following Zimmern’s classification, the First British Empire began to take shape 
in the 1 th century as an empire of the old type, such as those of Spain, Portugal, France 
and the other states of continental Europe. This empire reached its apex with the con uest 
of the North American territories, and it officially ceased to exist in July 1   , with the 
American Declaration of Independence. The Second Empire represented a more complex 
institution based on the British control of sea routes and on the supremacy of the Royal 
Navy. Its incredible development was stimulated by the rapid and immense growth of 
international commerce. The conclusion of this second British imperial experience 
occurred with the Great War and its tragic outcome. Finally, the Third British Empire was 
an empire of a new type, based on a very specific form of cooperation. The British 
Commonwealth of Nations was a structure where the right of self-government was 
recognized with a view to the former Dominions – at least those considered developed 
enough to manage their own institutions – and where every part of the Empire obtained 
an e ual representation at the post-War Conference. In fact, the war showed how British 
control over their empire became a complicated matter. The growing threats coming from 
the new world powers – namely, Germany and Japan – needed an increased investment 
in naval rearmament that Britain could no longer bear alone. It was therefore vital to bring 
the United States on board, to renounce its isolation and take an active part in the 
maintenance of the balance of power in favour of the Anglo-Saxon world. However, at 
the end of the Great War, in the United States there still did not exist the sub ective 
conditions for their association with the direction of world politics (Kendle, 19 9: 1- ). 
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 ro  t e rise of t e  oun   a le  ove ent to   a  An lo A eri ana  
Although the Paris Peace Conference is often represented as a meeting between David 
 loyd George, Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau and – not exactly form a position 
of e uality – Italy’s Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, a number of attendants 
in the French capital city were themselves historians, academics, or belonged to 
influential political circles. Among them, a group of delegates from the British Empire 
belonged to a very influential movement, which, behind the scenes, was able to influence 
Britain’s foreign policy for almost twenty years, setting the conditions for the 
establishment of a new world order. The members of the Round Table movement – this 
was the name of the group – who went to Paris were high-ranking officials of the British 
political establishment, such as Alfred Milner (Colonial Minister and Chairman of the 
Commission appointed to draft the mandates), Philip Kerr (then  ord  othian, private 
secretary of  loyd George),  ionel Curtis (adviser to the British Delegation), Robert Cecil 
(Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council)  the Australian John  atham, Frederic 
Eggleston, and Robert Garran  and George Beer from the U.S. However, it was  ionel 
Curtis’ and Philip Kerr’s role in Paris that was decisive in laying the foundations of the 
new Anglo-American system of power (Kendle, 19  :  -1 ). 
In order to better understand the Round Table’s ideas and how its members could 
successfully influence the British Prime Minister and the work of the Peace Conference 
during one of the most dramatic periods of British history – along with the Battle of 
Britain and Brexit – it is important to explain from where the movement originated. The 
nucleus of the main group – the membership of the Round Table movement spanned all 
of the self-governing Dominions – was based on Milner’s “Kindergarten” which played 
an important role in the creation of the South African Union. The Kindergarten was a 
group of young Oxford graduates who were recruited to help Milner resettle the Transvaal 
after the 2nd Anglo-Boer War. In South Africa, according to Milner, the British should 
have imposed the union of the four colonies which in turn would have led to the 
consolidation of the Empire. Once the South African Union was established, the attention 
should have focused on the creation of an organic union of the Empire in which all of the 
self-governing colonies could have played their part in deciding about – and taking 
responsibility for – the great  uestions of defence and foreign policy (Headlam, 19 1: 
2  ). Together with his religious faith in the Empire, Milner was influenced by the 
dominant philosophies of the time, which included social Darwinism, an un uestionable 
belief in the certainty of the superiority of the English-speaking peoples, a sense of 
A.   ONO RIO  CO O RN              
  i    .             .    v      
   
 
responsibility towards non-Europeans, and finally the idea of an Imperial mission 
(Worsfold, 191 : 219). 
In 190 , when  ord Selborne succeeded  ord Milner as High Commissioner for 
Southern Africa and governor of the Transvaal and Orange River colonies, the 
Kindergarten, and, especially,  ionel Curtis – the most active among Milner’s disciples 
– became increasingly preoccupied with the imperial implications of South African Union 
and began discussing the formation of an organisation to achieve a wider integration of 
the Empire (Bosco, 201 : 1- ). After achieving the creation of the South African Union, 
in 1909  ionel Curtis presented his idea to the others to found the Round Table, a 
movement whose main aim was the creation of an organic union of all of the British 
colonies. As Bosco describes, 
“the Round Table developed and propagated a political ideology which would have 
promoted and accompanied the transition from a British leadership of the Empire 
into an e ual partnership among its component parts. ( ) The invention of the 
principle of representation, and of federal government, they thought, were 
contributions which the Anglo-Saxon political tradition had offered to the 
development of the principle of self-government invented and experimented with in 
Athens, making thus possible its application to the national, and then to the 
supranational levels. ( ) If it were not possible to achieve that goal within the 
English-speaking peoples, who were the most advanced in the art of responsible and 
democratic government, they believed that nobody else could have succeeded. The 
British Empire in fact appeared to the Round Tablers as the most congenial 
organization of States to start with, in order to create and consolidate a federal 
nucleus set for enlargement” (Bosco, 201 :  ). 
The members of the Round Table thus became involved in the Irish  uestion, which was 
the most heated topic of British domestic politics in the years preceding the First World 
War. According to Curtis, Ireland was not a solely domestic matter, but a  uestion which 
involved the Dominions and the existence of the Empire. According to the  ondon group, 
creating a federation of the British Isles would have represented the first step towards the 
separation of domestic from imperial affairs. Freeing the Parliament of all the local 
matters it was called to legislate upon – by means of the creation of local parliaments for 
every constituent part of the United Kingdom – would have granted policy-makers more 
time to discuss imperial issues. In order to reach their aim, the members of the Round 
Table attempted to exert influence through the press and by contacting the most influent 
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representatives of the main political forces of the time, including the likes of Winston 
Churchill – converted to the federalist cause by Curtis – as well as  loyd George, Austen 
Chamberlain, Edward Carson (leader of the Ulster Unionists), Bonar  aw, Arthur Balfour 
and others (Kendle, 19 9: 1 2-1  ).  
Other than bringing the Round Table to the fore of the British political debate, the 
Irish  uestion caused the first open rupture with Milner. The father figure of the group 
was strongly opposed to home rule for Ireland and was aware of the fact that self-
government was too big a concession to Irish nationalists, who would not ultimately 
accept anything short of complete independence from Britain. As a staunch unionist, 
Milner was concerned that an independent Ireland would start a domino effect all across 
the empire, with the inevitable end of British economic, financial, political and military 
world supremacy (Bosco, 201 : 2 0-2  ). In order to stop the introduction of home rule, 
Milner decided to put all his power and influence into embracing the cause of Protestant 
Ulster and granting them every kind of support, included military ( ewis, 200 : 22- 1). 
In 1912, the introduction of a third Home Rule bill opened up a deep political crisis around 
the issue of Ireland and the outbreak of civil war was expected at any time. In fact, 
following the creation of the Ulster Volunteers, the signing of the British Covenant – 
supported also by  eo Amery, another Round Table member – and the episodes of 
Curragh and  arne, the member of the Round Table decided to devise a federal plan for 
the United Kingdom with a temporary exclusion of Ulster from the Irish unit. However, 
this kind of solution was hardly a compromise since it would have never been accepted 
by the Irish and would have left Ulster in a limbo, leaving the conflict between the two 
parts of the island unresolved. At the end, only the outbreak of WWI prevented the 
outbreak of a civil conflict in Ireland (Kendle, 19 9: 1  -1  ).  
Despite the failure of their federalist plan, the involvement of the Round Table in 
the Irish  uestion represented a beneficial experience for the  ondon members. They had 
been forced to deal with a dimension of the wider imperial  uestion. However, following 
this first experience, Kerr’s view of the distinctiveness of the two issue areas – Ireland 
and the Empire – prevailed, and the group decided to focus their attention exclusively on 
what they distinctly looked at as the imperial dimension (Bosco, 201 :2  -2  ).  
By 191 , the Round Table movement was present in all the Dominions and the 
local groups were crucial in keeping alive the debate on defence, foreign policy and the 
development of Imperial relations. During the war years,  ionel Curtis’ activities went 
uninterrupted and his publication – T e Pro e t o  a  ommon ealt  – became from mid-
A.   ONO RIO  CO O RN              
  i    .             .    v      
   
 
191  the movement’s Bible as such. From its strong advocacy of the creation of an 
Imperial federation based on the American model, with federal leadership being in charge 
of foreign and defence policies, retaining the power to raise revenues directly, it became 
apparent that the movement reached its maturity, and it was time to enter into the political 
arena. However, Curtis’ federalist plans were not shared by all the members of the 
 ondon group and some of them believed that such a measure would have alienated the 
support of those advocating a simple co-operative settlement (Curtis, 191 : 1-  ). 
Unexpectedly, Milner openly supported Curtis’ federal scheme presented in front 
of the Empire Parliamentary Association on 2  July 191 . However, not a single 
Dominion Member present agreed with them (Hall, 1920: 1  ). Few months later, at the 
spring session of the 191  Imperial War Conference, Resolution I  was passed, 
promoting a “read ustment” of imperial relations at the end of the war, “based on the full 
recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth,” 
and the preservation of “all existing powers of self-government and complete control of 
domestic affairs.” The Dominions should have obtained “an ade uate voice in foreign 
policy and in foreign relations,” and “effective arrangements for continuous consultation 
in all important matters of common Imperial concern” should have been agreed upon. 
The Resolution was a hard blow for Curtis, since it ruled out forever federalism as a 
solution to the crisis of the Empire (Donnelly, 19 0: 1 0-1 2). 
When the conflict was over, the Round Table was well aware that the war effort 
was the Empire’s swansong, and for this reason they recognized that a new approach in 
foreign policy was needed. It was at that time that the movement progressively shifted its 
focus from imperial to international  uestions (Bosco, 201 : 29 -29 ).  
The merit of the Round Table was to have recognized before others that the 
conflict started the process of transferring the centre of the international relations from 
the Channel to the Atlantic. To make this passage swift and painless, the movement 
focused all its energies on the creation of a close relationship with the United States 
(Hancock, 19 2: vol. 1.,  29-  2).  
 loyd George’s rise at 10 Downing Street, in which  ord Milner and the  ondon 
group played a crucial role, represented the big occasion for the Round Table to push its 
ideas at the centre-stage of British politics. Following the  loyd George leadership, 
Milner – supported by the Cecil family – was able to concentrate a vast amount of power 
in his hands and rapidly became the most powerful and influential force within the 
executive. From his position, Milner managed to appoint many members of the Round 
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Table in key posts within the new administration. The most remarkable was the 
appointment of Philip Kerr at  loyd George’s Private Secretariat from where he was able 
to push directly on the Prime Minister the Round Table’s agenda. From this moment on, 
having reached the centre of power, the movement began to exercise a political and 
cultural leadership which, for the next twenty years, had a fundamental impact on the 
evolution of British institutions and the British role in international affairs (Bosco, 201 : 
  0-   ). 
Following his appointment, Kerr started to build a very close relationship with the 
Prime Minister and ultimately served as  loyd George’s chief adviser and even as his 
intermediary in foreign affairs. In this position of unprecedented influence, Kerr 
dedicated himself to the realization of the Round Table’s wider ob ective of a new world 
order. In the war years, Kerr devoted much of his effort to two fundamental concerns: the 
definition of post-War aims and the strengthening of British relations with the United 
States. Kerr believed the war had not been a test of strength of the British Empire against 
the Central Powers but a war whose ultimate aim should have been “the democratization 
of Europe.” In Kerr’s view, British support for European democratic and national 
movements would weaken the Central European Powers, and converge towards the 
British idea of a democratic peace. Kerr believed that the post-war system should have 
been built on the newly established Supreme War Council which would also have 
provided the basis for the newly established post-war Anglo-American co-operation 
(Kerr, September 191 :   2- 9 ). At the same time, Wilson’s plans for a league of 
nations entered into the forefront of political debate. The American president’s innovative 
approach to international relations found large support in Great Britain, but Kerr, in spite 
of his long advocacy for a system of mutual defence, believed that “international 
machinery or treaties were not able to guarantee, by themselves, international peace, 
which could be achieved only through the creation of a federation, not a league of nations” 
(Bosco, 201 :    ). He thus showed  loyd George his concerns regarding the binding 
obligations and ties generated by the  eague. In 191  and 1919, Kerr, together with 
Maurice Hankey, the long-time secretary to the British cabinet, became a central  gure 
in the protracted – ultimately unsuccessful – British efforts to modify the  eague of 
Nations from the blueprint envisaged by Wilson, attempting to create a body with less 
extensive powers, particularly in terms of compulsory sanctions against transgressor 
nations (Roberts, 200 : 9 -21 ). Kerr suggested to convert the Treaty of  ondon “into a 
permanent international agreement”, to be extended also to non-European powers, and to 
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have every country commit “to respect the peace settlement and to maintain the 
Reparations necessary  to  enforce respect for international law on others, and to meet 
together from time to time in order to consider by full and frank discussions between 
responsible ministers, international problems as they arise.” The future of the world 
depended, according to Kerr, on that “great association of free peoples,” which 
constituted “all enlightened nations,” coming together “not to dominate the world or seek 
aggrandizement for themselves, but to protect the weak among nations, and to ensure that 
right and not the will of strongest shall be the governing principle in international affairs.” 
Only the British Empire, in Kerr’s view, incarnated this ideal, and it was worthy of a 
“thousand  eagues of Nations” as such (Bosco, 201 :    ). 
From this time onward, Kerr’s deepest political conviction remained apparently 
unchanged: his belief in a deeper Anglo–American understanding as the foundation for a 
new international order. During the war, his already numerous American contacts 
expanded significantly. Cooperation between Washington and  ondon would draw the 
United States, according to Kerr, into a wider peace-keeping role that Britain could no 
longer perform on its own. Kerr’s ideas had a great influence on  loyd George and Kerr’s 
presence in Paris represented a turning point in his public career (Saucier, 200 : 90-9 ). 
In Paris, Kerr was very optimistic regarding the geo-political settlement of Europe 
to be decided at the Conference, and he believed that the Allied victory would allow a 
redrawing of frontiers which would forever eliminate “nationalist  ealousies.” However, 
Kerr feared that the most serious problems would arise on the sub ect of the treatment of 
the colonies and of their “politically backward peoples.” Members of the Round Table 
believed that only direct intervention by the European powers would protect politically 
backward populations from the corrupting influences caused by the impact of Western 
civilisation, while encouraging their progress towards self-government. Regarding the 
United States’ role at the Conference, Kerr wrote a letter to Curtis in October 191  where 
he described his concerns. Kerr thought that the United States and Britain would continue 
to cultivate their partnership in the post-war years despite the fact that the Americans, 
unlike the British, still had “a childlike faith in the virtues of democracy and laissez faire,” 
and a different “attitude towards the problem of world government,” tending to believe 
that the assumption of international responsibilities was “ini uitous imperialism” (Butler, 
19 0:  9). 
According to Kerr, these differences were very harmful because they could have 
adversely affected Anglo–American relations during the Peace Conference and also 
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thereafter. Kerr thus concentrated all his efforts until his death in December 19 0, to 
persuade the United States to take responsibility for the world order (Saucier, 200 : 9 ). 
Most of Kerr’s ideas were taken up by Curtis in his article  indo   o   reedom, 
published in December 191 , which was a passionate appeal for Anglo–American 
cooperation to guarantee the ade uate functioning of the  eague, lest the Americans 
return to their pre-war policy of “isolation” (Bosco, 201 :    -   ). According to Curtis, 
unless the United States would have shared with the British Empire “the burden of world 
government,” the world would have experienced “the greatest danger which can threaten 
mankind.” Thanks to this article, Curtis received an invitation from Cecil to attend the 
work of the Peace Conference, and provided the underlying inspiration for the creation in 
late May 1919 – on the initiative of Curtis himself – of the Institute of International 
Affairs (Bosco, 201 :    -   ). 
The Paris Peace Conference had brought together officials and experts who were 
playing a ma or role in the process of the formation of foreign policy in their own 
countries and for this reason seemed vital to establish among them an institutional link to 
continue this work (McKercher, 1991: 1). The creation of the Institute followed a meeting 
between the British and American delegates – mostly involving the members of the 
In uiry set up in September 191  by Wilson’s closest advisor Colonel Edward M. House 
– at the Hotel Ma estic on  0 May 1919, where they agreed to create an organisation 
“which would act as a telephone exchange between few hundred men in each country 
who administer foreign affairs and create public opinion on the sub ect” (Bosco, 201 : 
  0). 
 The Institute represented a strategic change of the ob ective of the Round Table, 
since the reform of the Empire was no longer a likely outcome and the centre of gravity 
of world power had already shifted from the Channel to the Atlantic. Kerr and Curtis felt 
that they had to prepare the transition from an Anglo-French to an Anglo–American 
diarchy, and the Institute of International Affairs – later known as Chatham House – was 
the perfect tool to achieve this goal. According to  uigley, “the influence of Chatham 
House appears in its true perspective, not as the influence of an autonomous body but as 
merely one of the many instruments in the arsenal of another power,” namely the Round 
Table movement. The role of this movement in the fields of education, administration, 
politics, newspapers, and periodicals was incredible since “a small number of men” 
obtained an “almost complete control over the publication of the documents relating to 
their actions,” to exercise “such influence over the avenues of information that creates 
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public opinion,” and “to monopolize so completely the writing and the teaching of the 
history of their own period” ( uigley, 19 1: 19 ). 
As a matter of fact, the role played by Chatham House and the Council of Foreign 
Relations – its sister office in New  ork – in preparing the ground for the tran atio 
im erii is not comparable to any other institutions (King-Hall, 19  : 1-1 ). These 
institutes – defined in today’s parlance as think tanks – were the first to deal with the 
then-established science of international relations.  
 
Con lusion 
The formation of Anglo–American “institutionalized” cooperation played a crucial role 
during WWII, when the United States decided to intervene in the interest of the English-
speaking world in the fight against Nazi Germany. Bringing the Americans on board to 
share the British burdens, and establishing in this way an Anglo–American world 
hegemony, was the masterpiece of the members of the Round Table. In spite of the failure 
in creating a closer union of the Empire, those who took part in the movement widened 
and strengthened the concept of Pa  Britanni a, turning it into Pa   nglo  meri ana, 
which was to last for much of the 20th century (Mansergh, 19 2: vol. 1, 20 -21 ). As 
Bosco correctly emphasized, “the policy of Atlantic Alliance was not therefore the result 
of  ust a temporary convergence of the reasons of state of Great Britain and the United 
States during the First World War,” but “the accomplishment of a political pro ect 
pursued by two organizations specially created at Paris in May 1919 and active since then 
on both side of the Atlantic” (Bosco, 201 : 2  -   ). 
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